






The Embodied Roots of Social Cognition*
Abstract
I consider two distinct deflationary theories in social cognition that aim to explain action 
understanding without demanding meta-representational or mindreading processes: the 
first one is the ‘teleological stance hypothesis’ (TSH), claiming that we infer the intended 
goal of a certain observed action based on the mere perception of its effects and of its situ-
ational constraints; I decided to dub the second one ‘the embodied familiarity hypothesis’ 
(EFH) to comprise all the theories claiming that we recognize the intended goal of a certain 
action based on the perceptual or motoric expertise developed within the sensorimotor con-
tingencies associated to that action’s context. TSH’s main requirement is that the observer 
could ascribe efficiency, and therefore rationality, to the observed agent’s movement, while 
EFH’s main requirement is that the observer were somehow exposed to the perceptual or 
motoric details of the observed agent’s action. I argue that EFH describes a more primitive 
and fundamental form of action understanding, i.e. one that is necessarily presupposed by 
TSH: in fact, while recognizing efficiency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for detecting goal-relatedness, some kind of perceptual or motoric familiarity with the de-
tails of the observed action’s context is always necessary for any ascription of efficiency, 
and therefore of rationality, to the observed agent. I conclude that, while TSH might cer-
tainly be effective in describing certain rational forms of action understanding, it implicitly 
requires EFH to be true, as its inferential system would be groundless without an assumed 




Introduction: two deflationary approaches to social cognition
Social	cognition	is	the	field	of	interdisciplinary	research	that	studies	how	we	
comprehend	the	others.	It	is	interested,	among	various	things,	in	how	we	can	
understand1	 the	 goal	 of	 an	 observed	 action	 in	 an	 effortless,	 automatic	 and	
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argued	 for	 by	 various	 scholars	 (e.g.,	 Hutto	
2013),	 against	 any	 similar	 use	 of	 the	 con-
cept	of	 ‘understanding’:	even	 if	 it	were	 true	
that	 in	 the	philosophical	 literature	 this	word	
predominantly	indicates	intellectual	compre-












teraction	with	 the	others	we	do	not	 need	 any	 intellectual	 representation	of	
their	mental	states	(i.e.	propositional	contents	such	as	beliefs,	intentions,	and	
desires),	because	the	key	information	necessary	to	recognize	the	action	goal	











need	 to	 infer	 its	goal	based	on	 the	expected	effects	of	her	action	and	what	
we	see	of	her	current	contextual	circumstances:	 this	view	assumes	 that	 the	
observer’s	inference	is	reliable	insofar	as	she	realizes	that	the	observed	agent	




















is	perceptually	associated	 to	 its	 immediate	effects,	and	 these	effects	gain	a	
perspicuous	perceptual	meaning	during	live	experience	by	reason	of	the	his-
tory	of	the	unprincipled	embodied	engagement	between	interacting	agents).	









offer	more	 specific	 versions	 of	 the	motor	 cognition	 hypothesis,	which	we	
will	not	consider	here.	Therefore,	according	to	EFH,	goal	recognition	could	
either	rely	on	the	familiarity	that	the	agent	has	developed	in	responding	to	the	

















































feeling	 that	 artificially	 adopting	 an	 exten-


























an	 internal	 source	 of	 energy,	 hence	 suggesting	 animacy	 and	 goal-directed-
ness.	However,	these	features	are	insufficient	to	determine	the	particular	goal	
behind	one’s	action	(Anscombe	1957).	TSH	aspires	to	complete	the	picture,	













kinds	 of	mental	 representations:	 the	 agent’s	 beliefs	 (e.g.,	 “Paul	 thinks	 that	
there	is	a	banana	in	the	fridge”),	desires	(“Paul	wants	a	banana”),	intentions	
(“Paul	means	to	grab	a	banana”).	Combined	with	sufficient	perceptual	cues	
(“Paul	 is	reaching	for	 the	fridge”),	 the	knowledge	of	any	two	of	 these	rep-
resentations	is	sufficient	to	infer	the	third	one,	as	the	known	representations	
work	as	the	premises	of	an	inductive	reasoning	that	has	the	unknown	repre-
















assumes	 that,	 in	order	 to	build	up	such	systematic	 inferences,	 the	observer	
only	needs	 to	consider	–	 instead	of	 the	desires	 [A],	 the	 intentions	 [B],	and	
the	beliefs	[C]	–	 the	physical	goal-state	at	 the	end	of	 the	action	movement	
[A],	the	observable	bodily	movements	chosen	to	achieve	it	[B],	and	the	situ-
ational	constraints	that	objectively	bound	the	choice	of	the	movements	[C],	














reasons	 immediately	 related	 to	 reaching	 that	particular	goal	 In	 an	 efficient	
way.	Exactly	like	the	teleological	stance,	also	the	intentional	stance	assumes	
that	the	observer	attributes	a	capability	of	deliberation	to	the	agent	based	on	a	






















objection	 that	 the	 capability	 to	 comprehend	
various	 types	 of	 hand	 actions	 is	 commonly	
exerted	without	any	previous	familiarity	with	
those	 actions):	 one	 reason	 is	 that	 I	 have	 al-
ready	addressed	these	objections	somewhere	
else	 (Cappuccio	2012);	 another	 is	 that	 I	 be-
lieve	 the	 objections	 raised	 here	 against	 the	














































































































task	 at	 hand	 does	 not	 necessarily	 make	 it	 easier	 to	 evaluate	 the	 efficiency	




the	whole	body	do	not	always	follow	a	straight	 line:	 this	 is	because	of	 the	
physiology	of	the	animal,	and	its	behavioral	and	ecological	specificity	(e.g.,	
rabbits’	and	flies’	zigzag	trajectories).	The	reasons	behind	the	anti-economic-




































I	might	have	to	choose:	taking the stairs (fast,	but	long	and	energy-consum-
ing);	calling,	waiting	for,	and	then	riding the old elevator	(energy-preserving,	










































































how	can	we	choose	 the	parameters	 to	assess	 the	efficiency	of	an	action,	 if	
we	do	not	know	the	horizon	of	real-life	contingencies	that	motivates	its	goal	
yet?	Note	that	in	order	to	infer	–	as	postulated	by	TSH	–	whether	an	action	
is	efficient	or	not	 it	 is	not	sufficient	 to	have	an	 intuitive	grasp	of,	or	some	
kind	of	pre-reflective	holistic	sensitivity	to,	the	motivational	background	of	



















If	 the	competing	 representations	of	 the	parameters	of	efficiency,	with	 their	
overwhelming	 complexity,	 are	 the	 problem	 of	 basic	 action	 understanding,	
then	 there	 could	only	be	 two	 solutions:	 the	 first	 is	 that	 the	 agent’s	 actions	
actually	conform	to	certain	standardized	representations	of	his	goals	and	pri-
orities,	and	that	the	observer	were	instructed	in	this	representation,	being	in-




explain:	 the	 attribution	of	 a	 teleological	 valence	 to	 the	observed	 action	by	
means	of	an	inference.	Assuming	that	the	agent	were told	by	any	of	his	world-









































3. Inferring the goal of hand-actions 
  vs. neurocomputational complexity
So	far	we	have	been	considering	the	efficiency	of	 translational	movements	




able,	 and	 that	 the	 target	 object	 is	 attributed	 as	 a	 goal	 of	 the	 action	only	 if	
the	hand	acted	 efficiently	 to	obtain	 the	object.	Furthermore,	Gergely	 et	 al.	







former	 has	 no	 expertise	 in	 performing	 the	 latter’s	 movements.	 In	 accord-
ance	with	TSH,	Rochat	et	al.	(2008)	demonstrate	that	monkeys	look	longer	













































chain	 such	 as	 reaching-for-grasping-for-bringing-to-the-mouth.	 The	 modes	
of	the	cortical	initialization	and	on-line	control	of	these	movement	patterns	
reflect	how,	 in	 real	 life	 interactions	with	 the	environment,	 the	 fine-grained	




































































































that	 are	deemed	 to	be	generally	 significant	 for	 any	disembodied	agent,	 re-
gardless	of	their	contextual	situation	and	background)	they	methodologically	
























































parsimonious	means,	 loses	 sight	of	 the	 fundamental	distinction	 (Gallese	 et	










































and	 they	did	 this	 long	before	developing	capabilities	of	objective	quantita-





Different	experimental	 results	 (for	example	 those	on	canonical	neurons,	or	
the	transformations	in	far/near	space	due	to	tool	use,	Costantini	et	al.	2014),	
confirm	that	one	subject’s	goal-specific	motor	skills	are	selectively	and	flex-
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Utjelovljeni korijeni socijalne spoznaje
Sažetak
Razmatram dvije različite deflacijske teorije u socijalnoj spoznaji koje nastoje objasniti razumi-
jevanje djelovanja bez potreba za metareprezentacijskim procesima ili procesima čitanja uma. 
Prva je »hipoteza teleološkog stava« (TSH), koja tvrdi da o namjeravanom cilju određenog 
opaženog djelovanja zaključujemo samo na temelju opažanja učinaka djelovanja i situacijskih 
ograničenja. Drugu teoriju sam odlučio nazvati »hipoteza utjelovljene sličnosti« (EFH) kako 
bih obuhvatio sve teorije koje tvrde da namjeravani cilj određenog djelovanja prepoznajemo na 
temelju opažajne ili motoričke ekspertize razvijene unutar senzomotoričkih kontingencija pove-
zanih s kontekstom djelovanja. Temeljni je zahtjev TSH da promatrač može pripisati efikasnost, 
stoga i racionalnost, opaženim pokretima djelatnika, dok je temeljni zahtjev EFH teorije taj da 
je promatrač na neki način izložen opažajnim ili motoričkim detaljima opaženog djelatnikovog 
djelovanja. Tvrdim da EFH opisuje primitivniji i temeljniji oblik razumijevanja djelovanja, tj. 
onaj oblik koji TSH nužno pretpostavlja: ustvari, iako prepoznavanje efikasnosti nije ni nužan 
niti dovoljan uvjet za detektiranje povezanost i s ciljem, neka vrsta opažajne ili motoričke upo-
znatosti s detaljima opaženog konteksta djelovanja uvijek je nužna za bilo kakvo pripisivanje 
efikasnosti, a time i racionalnosti, promatranom djelatniku. Zaključujem da, iako TSH zasigur-
no može biti učinkovita u opisu određenih racionalnih oblika razumijevanja djelovanja, impli-
citno zahtijeva da EFH bude istinita, budući da bi takav sustav zaključivanja bio neutemeljen 









Verkörperte Wurzeln der sozialen Kognition
Zusammenfassung
Ich ergründe zwei unterschiedliche deflationäre Theorien innerhalb der sozialen Kognition, 
die angestrebt sind, das Verständnis des Handelns zu erläutern – ohne die Bedürfnisse nach 
metarepräsentativen oder gedankenleserischen Prozessen. Die erste ist die ‚Hypothese der te-
leologischen Haltung‘ (TSH), die behauptet, dass wir das beabsichtigte Ziel eines bestimmten 
beobachteten Handelns auf der Grundlage der bloßen Wahrnehmung dessen Effekte und Situ-
ationseinschränkungen erschließen. Ich habe beschlossen, die zweite Theorie ‚Hypothese der 
verkörperten Vertrautheit‘ (EFH) zu nennen, um sämtliche Theorien einzuschließen, die darauf 
bestehen, dass wir das beabsichtigte Ziel eines bestimmten beobachteten Handelns auf der Basis 
perzeptueller oder motorischer Expertise erkennen, die innerhalb der sensomotorischen, mit dem 
Kontext dieses Handelns verbundenen Kontingenzen entwickelt wurde. TSHs Hauptanforderung 
besagt, der Beobachter könne die Effizienz, und damit die Rationalität, den beobachteten Bewe-
gungen des Handelnden zuschreiben, während EFHs Hauptanforderung lautet, die Beobachter 
seien auf irgendeine Weise perzeptuellen oder motorischen Details des beobachteten Handelns 
des Agierenden ausgesetzt. Ich vertrete die Ansicht, dass die EFH eine primitivere und fundamen-
talere Form des Handelnsverständnisses beschreibt, d. h. jene Form, die von der TSH notwendi-
gerweise vorausgesetzt wird: In der Tat, während die Effizienzerkennung weder eine notwendige 
noch eine hinreichende Bedingung für die Detektion der Verwandtheit mit dem Ziel ist, erweist 
sich eine Art perzeptuelle oder motorische Vertrautheit mit den Details des beobachteten Han-
delnskontextes als ständig notwendig für jedwede Zuschreibung von Effizienz, und demgemäß 
auch von Rationalität, an den beobachteten Handelnden. Ich ziehe die Schlussfolgerung, dass 
während die TSH in der Schilderung gewisser rationaler Formen des Handelnsverständnisses 
sicherlich effektiv sein könnte, verlangt sie implizit das Zutreffen der EFH, da ihr Folgerungssys-





Inférence ou familiarité ?
Les racines incarnées de la cognition sociale
Résumé
J’examine deux théories de cognition sociale déflationnistes et distinctes, visant à expliquer la 
compréhension de l’action sans recours à des processus méta-représentatifs ou à ceux de lecture 
de pensée : la première est « l’hypothèse de la position téléologique » (TSH), affirmant que nous 
inférons le but visé d’une certaine action observée en nous fondant sur la simple perception des 
ses effets et de ses contraintes situationnelles ; j’ai décidé de baptiser la seconde « l’hypothèse 
de la familiarité incarnée » (EFH) afin d’englober toutes les théories qui affirment que nous re-
connaissons l’objectif visé d’une certaine action en nous appuyant sur l’expertise perceptuelle 
ou motrice développée dans le cadre des contingences sensorimotrices associées au contexte de 
cette action. Le critère principal de TSH est que l’observateur pourrait attribuer l’efficacité, et 
par conséquent la rationalité, au mouvement de l’agent observé, tandis que le critère principal 
d’EFH est que l’observateur soit en quelque sorte exposé aux détails perceptifs ou moteurs de 
l’action de l’agent observé. J’affirme qu’EFH décrit une forme plus primitive et fondamentale 
de la compréhension de l’action, soit une forme qui est nécessairement présupposée par TSH : 
en fait, tout en reconnaissant que l’efficacité n’est ni une condition nécessaire ni suffisante pour 
détecter le rapport avec l’objectif, une sorte de familiarité perceptuelle ou motrice avec les dé-
tails du contexte de l’action observée est toujours nécessaire à toute attribution de l’efficacité, 
et par conséquent de la rationalité, à l’agent observé. Je conclus que, tant que TSH pourrait 
certainement être efficace pour décrire certaines formes rationnelles de la compréhension de 
l’action, elle requiert implicitement qu’EFH soit vraie, puisque son système inférentiel serait 
sans fondement s’il était sans un contexte familier supposé de l’expertise incarnée.
Mots-clés
cognition	 sociale,	 position	 téléologique,	 neurones	 miroirs,	 rationalités,	 position	 intentionnelle,	
hypothèse	de	correspondance	directe
